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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL., 18

Right of First Refusal-Homogeniety
in the Condominium
I. INTRODUCTION

The condominium, a newly popular but relatively old' concept in
real property law, is defined basically as an apartment project involv-

ing individual fee ownership of a family unit in a multi-unit structure
or structures. 2 To complete the ownership picture, the individual

fee owners are also tenants in common, with undivided interests, in
the land on which the structure is built, and in other parts of the

structure which are not part of an individual unit. Due to the
anticipated popularity of this unconventional real estate ownership,

state legislation has blossomed in the past four years, and today, all
but a few states have adopted some sort of condominium statute.3
The act may be called a Horizontal Property Act,4 Apartment Ownership Act,5 or Unit Property Act;6 but its essential purposes are to
define the condominium concept and to provide for the execution

and public filing of a declaration of association and by-laws, the
guiding instruments for operating the project. These instruments

provide rules that must be followed to insure the success of cooperative living.

Once the condominium "regime" is established, the selection of
owners begins. Condominium dwelling, much like any other single-

structure apartment house or close-proximity garden. apartment housing,7 presupposes social compatibility among tenants, especially where
common facilities are shared. Homogeniety of neighbors is one of
the strong selling points stressed by real estate brokers and project

1. See Cribbett, Condominium-Home Ownership for Megalopolis, 61 MIcH. L. REy.
1207 (1963). See also Title News, Dec. 1962, vol. 41, p. 5, for a good, but, at the
present time, somewhat inadequate bibliography on the condominium concept and
application, both in this country and abroad.
2. The condominium is to be distinguished from the' stock-cooperative, a closely
related concept, in that the latter is a project whereby stock is issued in the
corporation which owns the apartment, and the stockholders in turn lease their
dwelling units from the corporation.
3. For examples of the variety of state statutes, see CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1350-59;
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 85-1601b to -1625b (Supp. 1963); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 381.805-.910
(1963); Mo. STAT. ANN. §§ 448.010-.220 (Supp. 1964); N.Y. REAL. PRor. LAW §§
339d-ii; P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31, §§ 291-93K (Supp. 1963); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
64-2701 to -2721 (Supp. 1964).
4. TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-2701 (Supp. 1964).
5. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1601b (Supp. 1963).
6. PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 68, § 700.501 (Supp. 1964).
7. The articles by Cribbett, supra note 1, and Berger, Condominium: Shelter on
a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUim. L. REv. 987 (1963), are tvo of the better
articles analyzing the advantages and problems of condominium dwelling as compared with ordinary home ownership, leaseholds, and stock-cooperatives.
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promoters, so it is probable that a prospective owner will be scrutinized with a view toward maintaining a single social and financial
status within the condominium. Such social and financial homogeniety
will keep the property value of the "neighborhood" of condominium
tenants relatively constant with surrounding property. The striving
for compatibility may be more specific: the project may be designed
for only elderly retired persons with common leisure interests, many
of whom desire a minimum of home maintenance chores; special
groups, such as labor unions or veterans' organizations, which may
have sponsored the project and want to keep it exclusively for that
group; 8 tenants who want to live in an area free of large families; or
owners who will ultimately want to share their project only with
those whose standards of living are to some degree similar. The last
objective, and any other that involves equality of financial status,9
can normally be met by setting a sale price that will tend to discourage
participation by all but a particular group. A further screening device,
however, is necessary if one desires to achieve a more sophisticated
homogeniety. Perhaps one might wish to limit co-tenants, for example,
to a specific age or social interest group.
The device most commonly chosen to control the selection of
co-tenants in the condominium is the right of first refusal or, as it is
sometimes called, the pre-emptive option. The right of first refusal
functions as follows: a unit owner, when he decides to sell his unit,
must first offer it to the managing authority of the condominium or to
one or more of the co-tenants who are willing and able to buy the unit
at the price offered by the prospective purchaser. 10 It is the purpose
of this article to examine the validity of the right of first refusal as
a possible restraint on the free alienation of property and as a future
interest subject to the rule against perpetuities. It will also evaluate
this right in light of state and federal laws prohibiting discrimination.
Comparisons will be made, where appropriate, with other property
control devices, such as restrictive covenants, consent clauses, and
possibilities of reverter.
II. OPERA MON OF THi RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL
The right of first refusal is ordinarily not written into the state
8. See Note, 61 HARv. L. R v. 1407, 1416 (1948).

9. Ascertaining social status may not be the only reason for examining a prospective
owner's financial portfolio. Since
acts of the managing authority
common .lements of ownership,
The problem is only partially

co-owners may be held jointly and severally liable for
or for accidents or transactions arising out of the
financial responsibility is a prerequisite to ownership.
solved by insurance. See Rubens, Right of First

Refusal and Waiver of the Right of Judicial Partition, 14 HASnNcs L.J. 255 (1963).
10. The possibility of the option being exercised at market price or at a price less
than that offered by the prospective purchaser will be examined below.
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condominium statute," perhaps to avoid the direct state sanction
of a property control device that tends to be discriminatory, or
perhaps simply to permit condominium developers to follow their
own ideas in deciding how they shall select and replace owners. It
must appear then, if it appears at all, in the declaration of association,12
or the by-laws of the regime, or in each individual contract of sale
or deed. Of these, the most desirable place to insert language
creating the right would seem to be the declaration-or master deedsince this instrument usually contains the covenants related to the
property.' 3 As long as the right must be exercised-or the option
must be given to exercise-within a period that would satisfy the
rule against perpetuities, each subsequent owner would be bound by
this "covenant" in the declaration, to which he must subscribe before
he can own a unit. The by-laws ordinarily contain only the rules of
operation and maintenance instructions 14 for the condominium association or managing authority, and thus, custom militates against
the inclusion of the right there. If the right is inserted in each individual deed by the association in the first instance, no problem arises
as to each owner being subject to the right. However, no compulsion
is thereby imposed on the original owners to insert such a provision
in their deeds to subsequent grantees. There has been some suggestion that the right should be treated as a covenant running with
the land, being in actuality a covenant on the use of land.15 In
this case, all subsequent grantees would be bound, subject to the
rule against perpetuities. If the concept of the covenant running with
the land is not utilized, each owner would be compelled to insert
the right in his deed to another only because of indirect pressure by
co-owners through their own option on his property.
In addition to a provision for the right of first refusal itself, the
declaration may grant, as a principal means of enforcement of the
right, the power to redeem or repurchase from a sale made without
allowing first options to the co-owners or managing authority. 16
11. Puerto Rico, however, does provide for the right of first refusal by statute.
Though it is technically not a part of the Horizontal Property Act of 1958, P.R. LAvs
ANx. tit. 31, §§ 1291-93k (Supp. 1963), § 1293k of the act refers to § 1275 of title
31, which provides for the right as regards multiple ownership of "stories or parts
of stories" in a single building.
12. The declaration of association is often referred to as the master deed. TENN.
CODE ANN. § 64-2707 (Supp. 1964). Some statutes require only one document.
13. Moller, The Condominium Confronts the Rule Against Perpetuities, 10 N.Y.L.F.
377 (1964).
14. Berger, supranote 7, at 1006.

15. Ibid.
16. B.Axismy, CoNDo mrum: ThE NEv Loox iN Co-ops 20 (1961). This pamphlet
comments at length on the Puerto Rican statute which provides for the right to
redeem in contravention of the right of first refusal. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31, § 1275
(1956).
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Another provision, normally necessary, is to provide that sales under
a power or pursuant to judicial proceedings, are excluded from the
operation of the right. Such a provision forestalls any inconvenience
to persons for whom the sale is effected, such as mortgagees or tax
lienors. It would unnecessarily complicate a foreclosure or tax sale
if the creditor first had to offer the property to a certain group of
people after he had ascertained the best outside price he could get
at an auction. 17
Though implicit in the pre-emptive option itself, it also may be wise
to point out that the right of first refusal does not apply to a
devise or gift of the property. An absolute option in the original
grantor, or in anyone else for that matter, to purchase from the
personal representative of the owner would probably be ruled 18a
restraint on alienation as an attempt to prevent a testamentary gift.
Inter vivos gifts would be similarly exempted. The right of first
refusal, however, would bind subsequent successors-in-interest, 19 as
long as their interest is not so remote that the right will be avoided
by the rule against perpetuities. In regard to devises or gifts of the
interest, the homogeniety of owners would still probably be maintained, as the donee of the gift would usually be a member of the
donor-owner's family.
Not to be overlooked is the possibility that a unit owner may want
to lease his unit to an undesirable tenant. In such a case, co-owners
or the managing authority should be allowed the first option to take
20
the lease.
A right to redeem a sale made without first offering to co-owners
is, nevertheless, no sanction on the unit owner to abide by the right
in the first instance. Perhaps, then, the by-laws of the condominium,
which provide for remedies by the managing authority or co-owners
in case any of the rules and covenants necessary for successful operation are violated, could likewise provide that these same remedies
be used against an owner who sells in controvention of the right of
first refusal. If the right were a part of the by-laws, it might be
subject to the provision in some state statutes that a failure to
17. Non-application of the right of first refusal to judicial foreclosure sales would
not frustrate the desire to maintain compatibility of co-owners since either the
managing authority or other owners could simply bid at the sale. See Comment,
50 CALIF. L. REv. 299, 318 (1962).

It may be safe, however, if the managing authority

or co-owners are unable to bid in at the sale for some reason, to provide that the right
is re-instated once title is placed back in an individual owner. Eagan, Declaration of
Restrictions, Title News, Dec. 1962, vol. 41, p. 36.
18. See Rubens, supra note 9.
19. See Eagan, supra note 17.
20. See, e.g., Rosecrest Apartments Master Deed, p. 17 (Memphis, Shelby County,
Tenn.) (right of first refusal applies to a sale or lease).
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comply with the by-laws is grounds for damages or injunctive relief
by the managing authority on behalf of the association of owners or
by an individual owner. 21 Allowing an injunction as a remedy, however, either in a statute or in the by-laws or declaration, to enforce
the right of co-owners to have a first option on the property, runs the
risk of having it labeled a disabling restraint on alienation.2 2 Another
possible remedy would be to grant each owner only a conditional fee
subject to a right of entry 23 or a fee with a possibility of reverter.2 4
For the right of first refusal to operate at all, the managing
authority or one or more of the co-owners or their designated agents
must be willing and able to buy the particular unit for sale, should
the prospective buyer not be approved. Usually, it will be impractical
for any one other unit owner to purchase the unit being offered
for sale. It may be possible to require the exercise of the option by
the managing authority upon the insistence of any one owner; a
"black-ball" system, however, would seem unfair and onerous to
the approving tenants. If the managing authority is the vendee all
co-owners must share the burden of the cost, so at least a majority
of owners should approve the purchase. 25 It may be better to
require unanimous consent to purchase and avoid the problem of
dissenter's rights.2 6 In any case, voting should be weighted according
to the value of each unit and the proportionate share of the common
elements each tenant owns; the share of the purchase price each
tenant must bear would follow the same lines.2 7 One danger in
allowing other unit owners to buy and sell units with any degree of
frequency is to invite the tag of "profit-making organization" being
placed on the owners' association, subjecting them to federal income
21. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-75 (Supp. 1963); FLA. STAT. § 711.23
(Supp. 1964); IND. ANN. STAT. § 56.1208 (Supp. 1965). Oregon allows such a remedy

for violation of any regulation or covenant, whether in the by-laws or not. OnE. Rzv.
STAT. § 91.630 (1963).
22. Disabling restraints, as

opposed to contractual

or forfeiture

restraints

are,

according to settled rules, invalid without qualification. See note 44 infra.
23. See Comment, 77 HArr. L. REv. 777, 779 (1964).

24. The value of the possibility of reverter may be substantial where the right of
first refusal is utilized as a discriminatory device contrary to the policy of the 14th
amendment. See note 114 infra and accompanying text.
25. Kreider, The Ohio Condominium Act, 33 U. CiNc. L. REv. 463, 447 (1964).
26. A co-tenant who voted against the exercise of the right of first option should

not be forced to share in the purchase price. Even a tenant who abstains from voting
at all might arguably be excluded, but the question would then arise whether without
his vote there can be unanimous consent. Perhaps the solution would be to allow
him to delegate his vote to a co-tenant who is in favor of exercise. See Comment, 37
So. CALIF. L. REv. 82, 97 (1964). To avoid an unfair burden on the co-tenant who
now has a double vote, and presumably liability double what would otherwise have
been his share of the purchase price, the purchase price could be redivided, excluding
the abstaining tenant.
27. Ibid. See also Kxeider, supra note 25.
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tax liability at ordinary income rates rather than capital gain rates. 2
Financing outside the association of owners avoids this problem.
For instance, it might be possible for the mortgagee of the whole
project to buy and hold a pre-empted unit until the managing authority
can find a suitable tenant. 29 This form of purchase obviously solves
the problem of a non-unanimous association vote (if unanimity is a
requisite) on whether to exercise the pre-emptive option.
A time limit within which to exercise the first option to buy must
be set. Ten days from the time of submission to the other owners or
managing authority is the limit set by the Puerto Rican Act. 30 Some
commentators think that at least thirty days would be a more realistic
time limit.3 1 The latter limit would seem preferable in order to give
the optionees time to raise the purchase price or provide for outside
financing. Thirty days would also be ample time to gather enough
information on a prospective buyer to accept or reject him on a
rational basis. 32 Upon lapse of the time limit, or beforehand, if the
association indicates a disapproval of the prospective buyer by its
33
refusal to purchase, the unit owner is free to accept the outside offer.
A supplemental problem, important in determining whether the
right of first refusal operates as a restraint on alienation, involves the
price at which the option to purchase can be accepted. As will be
seen later, a definite option price stated in the declaration or a price
substantially below that offered by a responsible third party prospective purchaser will probably violate the rule against restraints
on alienation. 34 Assuming more than one prospective purchaser, a
decision would have to be made whether the option is to meet the
28. Note, 18 VAND. L. Rrv. 1810 (1965); Note, 18 VAND. L. Rsw. 1832 (1965);
Comment, supra note 26.
29. Ibid.
30. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31, § 1276 (1956).
31. See, e.g., RAMSEY, op. cit. supra note 16, at 21.
32. The declaration or master deed could specifically provide what information
about the prospective buyer must be submitted to the managing authority. See, e.g.,
Rosecrest Apartments, supra note 20, at 17: "the name and address of the proposed
purchaser or lessee, and such additional information as the Board of Administration
may reasonably require, including social and business references, and financial statement, together with a duplicate executed copy of the contingent, or proposed contract
of sale or lease."
33. A unit owner will naturally be pressured to accept a proposed outside offer at
the earliest possible time, both by the real estate agent and the prospective buyer if
the price agreed upon in negotiations is mutually satisfactory. To wait until the
full option time limit expires may be fatal to the deal. Nevertheless, a co-owner would
be reluctant to accept a tenant he had previously approved if on further investigati6n
within the time period he should change his mind. The question would then arise as to
whether he was estopped by his previous approval to accept the option before the
time for acceptance expired. A certificate of release given the unit owner by the
managing authority could solve this problem. See Rosecrest Apartments, supra note
20, at 22.
34. See RESTATE ENT, PROPERTY § 413 (1944).
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best offer of a responsible third party or the lowest offer. Clearly,
there is less likelihood that the option would be held a restraint on
alienation if it were designed to meet the best outside offer. Perhaps
an appraisal value should be used,3 5 or a fair market value detennined
by a consensus of responsible real estate brokers or a local real estate
board. A relatively safe price would be the lower of (1) the best
outside offer or (2) the fair market value determined as above.30
III. COMMON LAw SANrnONs AGAINST TIE
RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL

The rule against restraints on alienation and the rule against
perpetuities are both designed to free property from unjustifiable
encumbrances tending to make it less marketable. The rule against
perpetuities is, in a sense, a specific subdivision of the rule against
restraints on alienation. It would strike down a grant of a contingent
interest which, being inchoate, is not necessarily considered a restraint
on alienation of the whole fee but for the fact that the inchoate
interest may not vest for a long time in the future.
In applying either of these rules, it is important to define the exact
nature of the encumbrance we call a right of first refusal or a preemptive option. Many courts when considering the right of first
refusal or pre-emptive option have erroneously applied prior cases
that have dealt with related but distinguishable concepts. 37 Closely
related to the pre-emptive option are such concepts, for instance, as
the simple option to purchase, the option to repurchase, or the option
in gross. The simple option to purchase is exercisable exclusively
at the will of the holder; it is not necessary that the property be
offered to him only when the owner wants to sell it. The option to
repurchase is simply an option held by the grantor of property to
repurchase from the grantee. If this option is exercisable only when
the grantee wants to sell, it should be clearly indicated in writing;
otherwise it might be considered exercisable at the will of the holder.
An option in gross is an option to purchase, whether or not pre35. There are at least three possible sources from which to arrive at an appraisal
value: (1) Federal Housing Administration, (2) Veterans Administration, (3) County
Tax Assessor. Either one of the first two sources could be used depending on whether
a mortgage on the property is insured by one or the other of these agencies. The
County Tax Assessor may be the least desirable of the three if it is likely, due to
the dearth of condominium projects in his jurisdiction, he will have had less experience
in assigning a value to a condominium unit and tax assessments rarely reflect the
precise value of property.

36. See Rosecrest Apartments, supra note 20, at 17.
37. See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 313 Ky. 249, 230 S.W.2d 918 (1950) (wlat
the court described as a right of first refusal, it nevertheless denoted an option to
repurchase).
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emptive, which exists independently of any other right in the
property such as a leasehold.3 It may also be important to determine
whether the right of first refusal should be defined as a covenant
or a condition with a forfeiture. 39
A. The Rule Against Restraints on Alienation

Normally, three social evils in modem land management are deemed
cured by the rule against restraints on the free alienation of property:
(1) the obstruction of commerce and productivity, (2) abuse of
creditors, and (3) "dead hand control"-the devising of property
encumbered by unreasonable or outmoded use restrictions. 40 There
are adequate reasons for concluding that none of these "evils" are
presented by condominium property subject to a right of first refusal.
The class of people potentially allowable under the pre-emptive
option restriction is probably sufficiently broad to rebut any argument
that property is taken out of commerce.4 1 Moreover, a condominium
developer is likely to seek out qualified purchasers diligently in
order to maximize his profits. 42 As to. creditors, if mortgage or tax
lien foreclosure sales are excluded from the operation of the right,43
most creditors will not be inconvenienced. Since the right should be
applicable only to commercial conveyances, the problem of dead
hand control is eliminated. Even inter vivos dead hand control-which
is possible where commercial conveyances have been made subject
to outmoded or less productive use restrictions-is no danger here,
since the right of first refusal can hardly be said to be an outmoded
or less productive use restriction.
The right of first refusal is less likely to be called a restraint on
alienation if it is a promissory or forfeiture restraint, as opposed to
a disabling restraint. 44 A forfeiture restraint operates to place the
property title into the hands of the grantor (or perhaps a third party)
38. 5 POWELL, REAL P.RoPERTY f 771, at 611 (1962)

[hereinafter

cited as

POWELL].

39. See, e.g., 6 Ammuc.N LAw OF PRoPERTY § 26.64 (Casner ed. 1952).

40. Bernhard, The Minority Doctrine Concerning Direct Restraints on Alienation, 57
MICH. L. REv. 1173, 1180 (1959). For an extended treatment of restraints on alienation generally, see Schnebly, Restraints on the Alienation of Legal Interests, 45 YALE
L.J. 961, 1186, 1380 (1935).
41. See Comment, 14 VAND. L. REv. 1535 (1961).
42. As to the unit owner, the rule against restraints should operate to destroy any
artificial barrier to his realization of profit on the sale of a unit. Berger, supra note 7,

at 1017. For this reason, as will be seen later, an option price substantially less than
that offered by the prospective purchaser may invalidate the option" altogether.
43. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
44.

R.STATEMENT,

PROPmTY §§ 405-06, 413 (1944).

The condominium assumes

a fee simple estate. Promissory or forfeiture restraints on estates for life or for a term
of years are more reasonably valid because such estates are less likely to be alienated
anyway. Id. §§ 409-10.
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by way of a possibility of reverter or right of entry if the unit owner
does not comply with the right. Ordinarily, forfeiture restraints are
considered to have less policy support than a contractual right of first
refusal and are therefore less likely to withstand the rule against
restraints on alienation.45 Condominium policy, however, favors a
forfeiture since it keeps undesirables out, rather than allowing them in
with the result that the only remedy left for co-owners is a suit for
damages. 46 Even though the phraseology of a pre-emptive option
does not indicate a covenant, the favoring of the contractual restraint
would cause a covenant to be presumed. 47 Therefore, if a forfeiture
is intended, it should be expressly stipulated.
Three other requirements are stated by the Restatement of Propejty 48 as being necessary to sustain the right of first refusal under
the rule against restraints on alienation. First, the option must be
to meet the particular outside offer received. Exercise of the option
at market or appraisal value would no doubt constitute reasonable
compliance. Exercise at a pre-stipulated price has been ruled a
restraint, 49 particularly where it is substantially below the fair market
value of the unit. Exercise of the offer of the prospective buyer at
a certain percentage, however, does not constitute a restraint if
otherwise reasonable.5 0 Second, the person holding the option must
be a designated person; otherwise an owner would not know to whom
he must first offer his property. An option exercisable by one person
and non-enforceable by his heirs is valid. 51 Finally, the option can
45. S-is & Smrrm, FUTURE INTERESTS

§

1154 (1956)

[hereinafter cited as Smxs

& S I]TI.
• 46. If the right of first refusal is considered a promissory right, a suit for specific

performance may be available. Options to repurchase, broadly, are enforceable,
provided they satisfy the rule against perpetuities. H. J. Lewis Oyster Co. v. West, 93
Conn. 518, 107 Ad. 138 (1919); Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 Atd. 312 (1914);
First Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Gideon-Broh Realty Co., 139 W. Va. 130, 79 S.E,2d
675 (1954); London & S.W.R.R. v. Gomm, 20 Cb. D. 562 (C.A. 1882). Preemptive options, in particular, are stated to be specifically enforceable in equity.
6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 39, § 26.64.
However, any court action exposes the pre-emptive option to invalidation if it is
considered a racial or religious covenant within the rule of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1946). The ramifications of this celebrated case on the right of first refusal
will be examined more fully in subdivision IV of this note.
47. 6 AimmcAN LAw OF PRoPERTY, op. cit. supranote 39, § 26.64.
48. RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY § 413 (1944).

49. Kershner v. Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1955); Brace v. Black, 51 N.J.
Super. 572, 144 A.2d 385 (1958).
50. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 413, 406 (1944). It is hard to understand that a
percentage option would be reasonable if the percentage is substantially less than the
offer or market value.
51. Campbell v. Campbell, supra note 37; Hall v. Crocker, 192 Tenn. 506, 241
S.W.2d 548 (1951).
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exist only for a reasonable time, even if it survives attack by the rule
2
against perpetuities.
The co-operative apartment, closely akin to the condominium in
its compatibility policy, has successfully limited the alienation of
membership interests as against the rule against restraints. Restraints
in co-operatives commonly force the unit lessee to obtain the consent
of the board of directors before he can sublease or assign his lease or
his stock in the co-operative, or offer first refusal to the board or other
lessee-stockholders before he can alienate his interest. Clearly,
the consent device would seem more likely to violate the rule against
restraints, than would the right of first refusal, since the burden of
sale is still on the unit owner after consent is denied. Under the right
of first refusal, however, the unit owner is allowed to make a sale
whether or not the prospective buyer is approved. 3 Nevertheless,
the "special nature" of a co-operative, in that it requires permanence
of tenancy, social compatibility, and financial responsibility for its
very existence, is such that even consent devices have been held not
subject to the rule against restraints on alienation.- Such restraints
might be struck if they are exercised for ulterior or illegal objectives,
such as racial or religious discrimination. 55
The policy dictated by the "special nature" of the co-operative does
not apply in every case to the condominium. The condominium unit
is exclusively a fee interest, rather than a hybrid-type leasehold.5 6
52. Allowance for exercise within a reasonable time may satisfy the rule against
perpetuities, but not if the exercise depends on a remote contingency. GRAY, RULE
AcANST PERPEMTIES § 330 (4th ed. 1942). The probability of an owner desiring

to sell his unit is obviously not remote. Moreover, lack of stipulation as to a time
limit does not necessarily void the option as a restraint. Price v. Town of Ruston, 171
La. 985, 132 So. 653 (1931).
53. RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY § 406h (1944); RA-msET, op. cit. supra note 16, at 21;
Berger, supra note 7, at 1019.
54. Gale v. York Center Community Co-op., 21 II. 2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30 (1960);
68 Beacon St. v. Schier, 289 Mass. 354, 194 N.E. 303 (1935); Weisner v. 791 Park
Ave. Ass'n, 190 N.Y.S.2d 70 160 N.E.2d 720 (1959); Penthouse Properties, Inc. v.
1158 Fifth Ave., Inc., 11 N.Y.S.2d 417 (App. Div. 1939). Viewing these decisions
analytically, it is not surprising that the restraints were upheld. A co-operative involves
two types of interests-the leasehold and the ownership of stock. Restraints on leaseholds are commonly upheld. Restraints on the alienation of stock, if they are of the
right of first refusal type, are, by the weight of authority, valid. See Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d
1318 (1958) and the cases cited therein. See also Note, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 123
(1960).
55. Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Ass'n, supra note 54. See also Bachrach v. 1001
Tenants Corp., 21 App. Div. 2d 662, 249 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1964), where it was held
that notwithstanding the illegality of a discriminatory consent device, the rejected
purchaser could not recover damages for the "tort" of discrimination. See generally
text accompanying notes 76-115 infra.
56. There has been some argument, however, that the reasonableness of the restraint
ought not to depend on the mechanical distinction between freeholds and leaseholds.
Berger, supranote 7, at 1019.
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Also, the financial interdependence in a co-operative is not so crucial
in a condominium.57 The co-operative is essentially a profit-making
organization with every tenant having a stake in the financial success
of the venture. It is probable, moreover, that these differences are
inconsequential in regard to the rule against restraints on alienation
where the right of first refusal is at stake. Alienability is not restrained
but merely delayed to allow particular individuals an opportunity
to buy. Also the condominium owners have a certain automatic
financial tie-up in that they are tenants in common of the common
elements in the project; it would seem that tenants in common have
a legitimate interest in associating with only mutually desirable co58
owners.

B. The Rule Against Perpetuities

The rule against perpetuities poses a possible obstacle to the validity
of the right of first refusal since the right might be exercised beyond
a life or lives in being plus twenty-one years. This is true whether
the option is inserted in a master deed controlling all sales during
the operating existence of the condominium, or in each individual
deed, if its exercise is not limited to a particular person or persons
then living. Obviously, if it can be exercised by the managing
authority, a body designed to exist for an indefinite time, the rule
would operate to invalidate the right. If inserted in each individual
deed, it may be that the grantee's life will be considered the measuring life, without any other provision to the contrary, and therefore
the contingency would not be considered a perpetuity. This construction, however, overlooks the possibility of devise or inheritance
where no deed is involved and the contingency could take place
beyond the time limit.
Every future interest in property, however, is not within the policy
of the rule against perpetuities. Is the right of first refusal such an
interest? It will depend on whether courts consider the right a
covenant or a forfeiture interest-a contingent 59 interest enforced by
an action for damages or specific performance, or by the possibility
that, if on the occurrence of the contingency the right is not allowed,
the grantor or some third person will assume title to the land.
There is a line of authority, stating that options to repurchase re57. ibid.
58. See Bernhard, supra note 40, at 1183. Right to conveyance of one's interest in
a joint tenancy with right of survivorship may be restrained. Swannel v. Wilson, 400
Ill. 138, 79 N.E.2d 26 (1948).
59. At least one court has stated that an absolute option to repurchase in a deed
creates a conditional fee and therefore a present vested interest in the grantor, and
thus is not subject to the rule against perpetuities, there being no contingency involved.
Dozier v. Troy Drive-in-Theatres, 265 Ala. 93, 89 So. 2d 537 (1956).
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served in the grantor and unlimited as to time of exercise are contract
rights specifically enforceable in equity and subject to the rule
against perpetuities.60 Specifically, a pre-emptive option is also subject to the rule, if social policies do not outweigh the policies favoring
its operation.6' However, if the right of first refusal is a contract right,
should it not be treated like an ordinary land purchase contract right
which is not subject to the rule against perpetuities?12 The distinction,
of course, is that in the land purchase contract only the transfer of
63
legal title and the payment of the purchase price are deferred
while in the option to purchase there is a deferral of the agreement
to purchase, and this may never take place. Essentially then, the
conveyance is more likely to be consummated in a simple contract
to purchase than in an option to purchase. Perhaps it could be
argued that the right of first refusal is a covenant running with the
land, being a covenant on the use of land, and as such not subject to
64
the rule.
The problem of the rule against perpetuities may be solved if the
right is termed a forfeiture-type restraint. If the owner of a particular
unit contracted to sell such unit without first offering it to the coowners, then it could be provided that the fee would automatically
revert to the original owner, who no doubt would seek to hold title
for the benefit of the other unit owners until a desirable owner could
be found. The device for enforcement then would be a fee simple
determinable with a possibility of reverter which is not subject to
the rule against perpetuities, 65 it being considered for this purpose
60. Rocky Mountain Fuel Co.. v. Heflin, 148 Colo. 415, 366 P.2d 577 (1961);
Neustadt v. Pearce, 145 Conn. 403, 143 A.2d 437 (1958); First Huntington Nat'l
Bank v. Gideon-Broh Realty Co., supra note 46; London & S.W. R.R. v. Gomm, supra
note 46. Annot., 162 A.L.R. 581 (1946), indicates that this represents the weight of
authority. Contra, Weber v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1936) (the right of
first refusal in a lease of unlimited duration does not violate the rule against perpetuities).
61. 5 PowELL ff 771[2], at 611; RiEsTATMENT, PROPERTY § 394 (1944).,
62. Hill v. State Box Co., 114 Cal. App. 2d 44, 249 P.2d 903 (1952); SnmEs &
SminH § 1246. The reason for excluding land purchase contracts is that each party has
a vested equitable interest.
63. SimEs & SmrrH § 1245, at 62.
64. Id. § 1246. The rule against perpetuities concerns itself with interests in property
rather than contracts for the use of property. See Moller, The Condominium Confronts the Rule Against Perpetuities,10 N.Y.L.F. 377 (1964).
65. However, the rule against perpetuities may not be necessarily avoided. Creating
a possibility of reverter as an interest to take effect when a unit owner tries to sell
his unit without offering it first to other unit owners presents an additional interest
rather than a substitute interest. The right of first refusal is not itself a possibility
of reverter, so it may still be subject to the rule against perpetuities; whereas the
device used to enforce the right is a possibility of reverter and is not subject to the
rule against perpetuities.
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Exclusion from the rule, however, would

probably benefit only a reverter-type forfeiture and not a forfeiture

over to a third party. And yet the possibility of reverter is freely
alienable by its holder,6 7 and it cannot be extinguished by a convey-

ance of the fee.8 As will be seen later, the possibility of reverter,
being an automatic restrictive device and not subject to court enforce-

ment, may possibly avoid the restrictive covenant's fatality under
the rule of Shelley v. Kraemer.69
C. Preventingthe Operationof These Rules
A strong academic argument has been advanced to the effect that

the right of first refusal, as applied to condominiums, serves a useful
social function and should not be invalidated as a restraint on
alienation or a perpetuity.70 It may be argued that these rules were
never meant to have any application to commercial transactions, only

to decedents' estates and family settlements. 71 Since the right of
first refusal should be limited to only voluntary sales, this argument
might be persuasive. Perhaps, however, the best way to prevent

the operation of the rules is by specific statutory exemption in condominium acts,7 2 as has been done in some states. 3 Otherwise, the
rule against perpetuities can be avoided only by providing that the

option shall extend for a time within life or lives in being plus
twenty-one years. Since a grantor's life is usually the measuring life
and since the condominium regime itself is the original grantor of

each unit, some living, identifiable group could be used, such as the
children then living of the original owner of the land, or the living
descendants of the President of the United States or the Queen of
66. SLNrs & SMrrn § 1239. It is labeled "vested" purely by historical accident. It
could well be argued that the possibility of reverter is a contingent interest since it
is subject to a condition that may never occur; the weight of authority, however, seems
to exclude it from the operation of the rule against perpetuities. For a discussion of
the operation of the rule as to the possibility of reverter on destruction of the
condominium, see MacEllven, Perpetuities, Title News, Dec. 1962, vol. 41, p. 34.
67. SIrmEs & SmrrTx § 159. Contra, Board of Educ. v. Baker, 124 Tenn. 35, 134
S.W. 863 (1911).
68. SLIES & S1miTH § 281.
69. See note 46 supra.
70. See, e.g., 4 POWELL 1 633.14, at 776: "Clearly, an option annexed to one
owner's interest in favor of all the owners is substantially different from a simple option
in gross. It should be held that such an option although it may fetter alienation, is
socially desirable and should be upheld."
71. See, e.g., Moller, supranote 64.
72. 4 POWELL 1 633.14, at 776. See also Sparks, A Decade of Transition in Future
Interests, 45 VA. L. REv. 493-94 (1959), where the author discusses statutory
revision of the rule against perpetuities generally.
73. D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-926 (Supp. IV, 1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. § 76-807 (Supp.
1964); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 448.210 (Supp. 1964); Nvia. REv. STAT. § 76-807 (Supp.
1964).
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England.7 4 The restraints rule, though perhaps not avoidable by a
written provision in the master deed, may not be as serious a threat
to the right as is the rule against perpetuities. Perhaps a version of the
"wait and see" rule that is often applied as a policy substitute to
lessen the burden of the rule against perpetuities could be applied
by courts in this particular situation to avoid application of the rule
against restraints on alienation: wait and see if the unit is actually
alienated and at a price fair to all parties; if the right is to function
properly, the unit will be sold and a suitable occupant thereby chosen
in the process2 5
IV.

RAcIAL OR

RELIGIOUS

DiscRIMINATION BY

WAY OF TE 1RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL

In examining the validity of the right of first refusal, both as a
-device inherently discriminatory or merely discriminatory in its
application, this article will not attempt to review moral and sociological arguments for or against racial discrimination in housing.7 6
Suffice it to say, the proponents of such a device would argue that its
legitimacy from a non-legal standpoint, so far as voluntary observance
is concerned, is supported by the constitutional guarantees of the
right to hold and dispose of property, free from uncompensated "confiscation" by the state and the freedom of association. Opponents
of the device and supporters of anti-discrimination legislation would
argue that the fourteenth amendment, forbidding any state action
resulting in discrimination, projects a moral obligation to the effect
that one group of citizens must allow another group of citizens equal
74. See, e.g., Rosecrest Apartments Master Deed, supra note 20, at 17.

See also

Comment, 50 CALwF. L. REv. 299, 307 (1962).
The use of "Royal lives" as measuring lives where commercial transactions are

involved has met with some criticism as comprehending too broad a group of people
to be practicably traceable. While noting that the extent of the problem should not
be exaggerated, Leach and Morris have suggested that statutory enaction of a definite
specified number of years as the perpetuities period would avoid the tracing maze.
MoRuS & LEAcH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETurris 68 (1962).
75. The "wait and see" rule requires that a court not rule on the validity of a
future interest under the rule against perpetuities until the event happens upon which
the vesting of the interest depends. The court will then use hindsight to determine
if this event was certain to happen within the period of perpetuities. LEACH & TUDOR,
Tr RULE AGAINST PERPETuTJTEs § 24.21 (1957). The operation of the right of first
refusal, if it is a restraint on alienation, is so, not simply because it might occur at a
remote time, but because at the time of its creation it is a restraint, regardless of when
it occurs.

So in applying the "wait and see" rule to the rule against restraints on

alienation a court would, when the event occurred, determine whether the event
itself, rather than its remote occurrence, was a restraint.
76. For a good discussion of such arguments, see Tovey, Discrimination, AntiDiscrimination Legislation, and Freedom of Choice in Housing: A Dialogue in AVINs,
OPEN OCCUPANCY

(1963).

VS.

FORCED HOUSING UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

50-67
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opportunity to acquire the necessities of life. In lieu of enforcing this
moral obligation in the courts on the theory that the Constitution
forbids private discrimination, victims of discrimination have been
allowed relief only on the theory that the Constitution forbids
discrimination which in the slightest measure is government "supported," unless they also have the benefit of non-discrimination on fair
housing statutes.
A. Anti-Discriminationby Statute
Private housing discrimination in any form can and has been
forbidden by state legislation on the theory that public welfare may
require limiting purely private rights,7 7 and by the federal government
both through its mortgage insurance business78 and more generally
through activities receiving any federal financial assistance.70 It would
be difficult for the private condominium developer to avoid the burden
of one of these statutory sanctions, even in states having no antidiscrimination legislation, since his mortgage financing is likely insured
by the Federal Housing Authority or the Veterans Administration.
In his own favor, however, it might be difficult to prove that the
right of first refusal, which operates indiscriminately on any sale, is
actually being used as a discriminatory device.
Federal legislation forbidding housing discrimination has developed
primarily in the past three or four years. Federal policy in this area
has been traced from a pre-World War II encouragement of racially
restrictive covenants because of a felt need for segregating "incompatible" groups, to a post-war policy of "laissez faire" (after the
decision in Shelley v. Kraemere0 ), to a policy of "equity" in seeing
that minority groups get their share of public housing available, and
finally to a more recent policy of leaving these problems to local
community decision.8' In 1962, President Kennedy ordered that all
administrative agencies "insofar as their functions relate to the
provision, rehabilitation, or operation of housing and related facilities
... " are to make rules preventing discrimination. 2 The agencies were
directed to cancel any federal assistance and to refuse it in the future
so long as non-compliance with the rules continued. Condominiums
77. See 1961 U.S. COMM'N ON Civmx Ricrrrs REI.-HousiNG 198, for a comparison
of some 17 state anti-discrimination statutes. The public welfare theory, as against
the theory of private property rights is well discussed in Massachusetts Comm'n Against
Discrimination v. Colango, 344 Mass. 387, 182 N.E.2d 595 (1962).
78. National Housing Act of 1961 § 234, 75 Stat. 160, 12 U.S.C. § 17 15 (y) (1964).
79. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 78 Stat. 241 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1964).
80. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
81. Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota, 6 How. L.J. 30, 41 (1960).
82. Exec. Order No. 11063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527 (1962).
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were affected by this ruling and by a 1964 amendment to the National
Housing Act of 19613 providing for FHA-insured mortgages for condominium projects both of a single or multiple structure variety, in addition to mortgages for individual units. In these mortgaged projects,
the Federal Housing Commissioner "may require that the rights and
obligations of the mortgagor and the owners of other dwelling units
in the project shall be subject to such controls as he determines to
be necessary and feasible to promote and protect individual owners,
the multifamily project and its occupants." 84 In addition, a prior act 85
authorizes the Commissioner to make rules and regulations regarding the conditions of these mortgages. Under this authorization, the
Commissioner has quite thoroughly restricted condominium mortgages
insured by FHA to those projects that not only refrain from racial
discrimination, but those built and sold with affirmative covenants
that the mortgagors and mortgagees will not impose any restriction
86
on the sale or occupancy on the basis of race, color or creed.
In the area of state legislation, fair housing or anti-discrimination
codes concerning private 87 housing practices have generally been
ruled constitutional when questioned. 8 Fair housing codes can reach
brokers8 9 and real estate developers 9° (a fortiori, condominium de83. National Housing Act of 1964 § 234, 78 Stat. 780, 12 U.S.C. § 1715(y) (1964).
84. Ibid.
85. National Housing Act of 1950 § 211, 52 Stat. 23, 12 U.S.C. § 1715(b) (1964).
86. When applying for FHA insurance, the seller of a previously unoccupied
family unit must file a certificate of non-discrimination with the Commissioner. 29
Fed. Reg. 500 (1964), amending 24 C.F.R. § 234.16 (Supp. 1964). The mortgage
itself must contain a covenant of the unit mortgagor that he will not execute any
instrument imposing a restriction on the sale or occupancy because of race, color, or
creed; if he fails to do this, the mortgagee can forthwith declare the unpaid balance
due and payable. 24 C.F.R. § 234.50 (1962). The mortgagee may have to establish
to the Commissioner's satisfaction that no racial restrictions on the sale or occupancy of
the property have been filed of record. 24 C.F.R. § 234.66 (Supp. 1964).
87. It is clear that public housing projects are so infused with state action that the
fourteenth amendment will put a halt to discrimination as a practice without, of course,
the necessity for anti-discrimination or fair housing laws. Detroit Housing Comm'n v.
Lewis, 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955).
88. See Comment, 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 769 (1963). See also Levitt & Sons,
Inc. v. State Div. Against Discrimination, 31 N.J. 514, 158 A.2d 177 (1960);
New York State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apartments, 7 Misc.
2d 334, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1958). Washington and Ohio, however, have
found constitutional grounds for striking down such laws. O'Meara v. Washington
State Bd. Against Discrimination, 58 Wash. 2d 793, 365 P.2d 1 (1961) (nondiscrimination statute aimed at publicly-assisted housing violates due process as an
unreasonable classification of homeowners); Terry v. City of Toledo, 194 N.E.2d 877
(Ohio App. 1963) (ordinance was too loosely drawn; private property rights were
violated). But see Porter v. City of Oberlin, 9 RACE REL. L. REP. 310 (Ohio App.
1964), where another district appellate court in Ohio held to the contrary.
89. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 112, '§ 87AAA (Supp. 1964); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 659.033 (1963).
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velopers), but typically one-home owners and real estate developers
with less than three units in a project are excluded.9 1 In addition to
state codes, the FHA and VA, through co-operative agreements with
those states with anti-discrimination laws, can refuse to do business
in the future with those real estate developers who have been found
to consistently discriminate under the state laws. Finally, it has been
suggested that "benevolent housing quotas" be enacted in those
states with anti-discrimination laws to assure a certain racial balance
in projects that border on already existent ethnic neighborhoods.
These benevolent quotas may be more likely declared unconstitutional,
however, since any classification based on race is suspect, and the
Supreme Court has generally refused to use a "group rights" approach
2
to fight discrimination
One development not to be overlooked in fair housing legislation
is the recently passed proposition fourteen constitutional amendment
in California, 93 which essentially rules out any interference by the state
in a property owner's right to sell to whomsoever he chooses. Prior
to submission of this amendment to the electorate, there was criticism
that the amendment encouraged discrimination by its very passage
and that the state owed an affirmative duty under the fourteenth
amendment to discourage discrimination.
It will likely be some
time before cases testing the constitutionality of the legislation reach
the Supreme Court. In the meantime, this device is being resorted
to on a city ordinance level in Michigan.9
B. State Action Under the FourteenthAmendment
In most cases, because of its size and complexity, a purely private
condominium project will be the exception rather than the rule, and
the slightest connection with state government may subject it to
fourteenth amendment prohibitions. Courts are moving slowly in
this area of expanding state involvement, but they are moving, and
90. Comment, 8 RAcE REL. L. REP. 769 (1963);

1961 U.S. COMm'N ON CIVIL

BiGH~s BEP.-HousINC 198.

91. Ibid.
92. Navasky, supra note 81. Housing quotas may be unconstitutional in that they

necessarily result in the denial of the facilities because of race. CALIF. AT'ry GEN. Op.
63/120 (Feb. 20, 1964). See 9 RACE REL. L. REw. 1589 (1964). They may also
violate state anti-discrimination statutes. Cooney v. Katzen, 41 Misc. 2d 236, 245
N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1963). But cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
See also Note, 18 Vu,,D. L. REv. 1290 (1964).
93. 9 RACE REL.L. REP. 1894 (1964).
94. See, e.g., Clancy & Nemerovski, Some Legal Aspects of Proposition Fourteen,
16 HAStiNGs L.J. 3 (1964).
95. See Turner v. Ledbetter, 9 RAcE REL. L. REp. 322 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1964),
re'd sub nom., Greater Detroit Homeowner's Council v. Moynihan, 9 RAcE REL. L.
REP. 893 (Mich. Sup. Ct. 1964).
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the day may come when an enterprise-no matter how private-will
not be allowed to discriminate where its only connection with the
state is a city building permit or a real estate license for the developer.96 State connection with private property has already appeared in building restrictions in urban renewal projects, 97 the sale
of property by a city with restrictions as to its use,98 and tax exempt
status combined with state officials in their official capacity on the
board of trustees. 9 Usually, where the state connection is only minor,
a combination of factors is required to constitute state "action" under
the fourteenth amendment. For instance, licensing and building
inspection by the state would not be enough; but if, in addition, the
project were being financed through FHA or VA mortgage insurance,
sufficient government activity is present. 10 It could be argued that
even the Horizontal Property Act alone supplies the necessary state
action. One argument worthy of note is that the condominium is a
"community" clothed with the characteristics of a local government
itself. 101 This argument would be more convincing if the project were
developed exclusively for the use of labor union members since labor
unions, even though private organizations, are extensively regulated
by government. 02 State connection has been found in even more
subtle terms, such as where a state condemns property as a subterfuge for preventing a property owner from selling to persons of a
minority race. 0 3 The next logical step, of course, would be to find
state action in the manipulation of zoning laws. It is doubtful, however, that ordinary local government services for private owners,
such as water supply and sewage disposal, would be a requisite state
connection.'0 4 If state connection can be found, however, or if antidiscrimination laws are enacted and, as they tend to be, diligently
enforced, the right of first refusal will be a prime and vulnerable
target, if ever used for racial discrimination.' 5
96. See Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
97. Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1963),

modified and aff'd, 336 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1964).
98. Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962) (the restrictive

device used was a possibility of reverter). But see Tonkins v. City of Greensboro,
276 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1960) (outright sale by city of a public swimming pool with
no strings attached is not state action); accord, Wood v. Hogan, 215 F. Supp. 53
(W.D. Va. 1963).
99. Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674 (S.D. La. 1962).
100. Ming v. Hogan, 3 RACE REL. L. REP'. 693 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1958).
101. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
102. Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv.
473, 482 (1962).
103. Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961).
104. Hackley v. Art Builders, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 851 (D. Md. 1960).
105. In Moy v. Hanson, 9 RAcE REL. L. REP. 1976 (1964), the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations enjoined the refusal to sell to an oriental; the discriminatory device used was the right of first refusal.
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C. The Special Application of Shelley v. Kraemer
The landmark case of Shelley v. Kraemer'06 established that it is
"state action" for a court, at the behest of other property owners for
whose benefit the covenant was made, to enforce a racially restrictive

covenant against sale to a member of the restricted race. The case
has been specifically applied to co-operative projects with restrictive
covenants, 10 7 but it has not been applied in those instances where
the restrictive nature of the exclusion device is not shown on its face,
or at most where it is not shown on its face to be a restriction based
solely on race or religion. Left open, then, is the question of whether
Shelley can be made to apply to a restrictive device that in its use
may exclude individually some member of a minority race, but is

nevertheless designed to exclude incompatibles on a broader basis
than just race or religion. It is equally unclear whether race exclusion
by means of a "tacit understanding," not evidenced by a written
covenant, can come under the purview of Shelley. 0 8 Moreover, Shelley
speaks of court enforcement in the sense of basing a cause of action

on the covenant or "tacit understanding" and mentions nothing of
enjoining a practice of racial discrimination as a result of the use of
discriminatory device. However, "enforcement" of a restrictive cove-

nant should not, it would seem, depend on whether the state court
is enforcing a cause of action for a plaintiff or a defense for one who is
being accused of discriminating. 10 9 It has also been suggested that

the "enforcement" doctrine of Shelley encompasses not just formal
adjudication of rights under a restrictive covenant, but the passive
allowance by a state of the existence of such a legal relationship.

10

106. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
107. Harris v. Sunset Island Property Owners, Inc., 4 RACE RBEL. L. REp. 716
(Fla. 1959).
108. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926), is often loosely cited for the
proposition that private discrimination, voluntarily observed, is not proscribed by the
fourteenth amendment. An unwritten "understanding" that certain races will be
excluded must apparently be clearly evidenced before a court will act. Tate v. City of
Eufaula, 165 F. Supp. 303 (M.D. Ala. 1958).
109. The Supreme Court has neatly dodged this issue. In Rice v. Sioux City Memorial
Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70 (1955), the question arose as to whether a
restrictive covenant regarding burial privileges could be enforced when used as a
defense for an action for specific performance of a burial contract. The Supreme
Court of Iowa had ruled that the defense could constitutionally be relied upon, The
United States Supreme Court was equally divided on the question and so affirmed the
Iowa decision. However, on rehearing, it was learned that there was an anti-discrimination law in effect in Iowa which should not have been disregarded by the Iowa
courts. So the Supreme Court decided to dismiss the writ of certiorari as having been
improvidently granted: "Had the statute been properly brought to our attention and
the case thereby put into proper focus, the case would have assumed such an isolated
significance that it would hardly have been brought here in the first instance." Id. at 76.
110. Horowitz, Fourteenth Amendment Aspects of Racial Discrimination in Private
Housing, 52 CALrF. L. REv. 1, 27 (1964).
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Are we -to say then that state action can be found in every legal
relationship between private persons, irrespective of whether it is
court enforced or voluntarily enforced?
The problems, then, that proponents of Shelley must overcome in
applying the case to the condominium right of first refusal are: (1)
that the right is not a restrictive covenant based on race or religion,
and since it can be used to exclude undesirables for other reasons
beside race or religion (such as mere whim, for instance), it has,
at least, some clearly constitutional uses, and (2) even if treated
like a restrictive covenant, the state action involved will have to be
shown in some measure of formal court enforcement, rather than
just in the allowance of voluntary adherence. Solution of the first
problem may depend on whether a victim of discrimination has
access to the protection of anti-discrimination laws. If he does, any
clearly discriminatory action under right of first refusal would be
enjoinable."n If there is no anti-discrimination statute" 2 a victim of
discrimination can prevail only if he overcomes the second problem
and attributes some sort of "stateness" to private discriminatory acts,
or at least forces the private party to enforce his discriminatory device
in a court of law.11 3 Perhaps here the discriminating condominium
regime could avoid court action by use of the possibility of reverter
in its pre-emptive option; an automatic reversionary interest vests
without any necessity to assert or enforce a right of entry." 4 It is
unlikely that the discriminatory use of the device would escape court
action in some way, however, since the victim of discrimination must
111. See note 105 supra.
112. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950), may offer some indication of what a court will do
in the absence of a fair housing statute, (it was enacted later in New York) and
where there is simply a refusal to sell not based on any restrictive covenant; there,
even though there was other possible state action in that the housing project was
being built under contract with the City of New York, the discrimination victim's
complaint was dismissed. This case has obviously lost some of its force in view of
the expansion of findings of state action and, of course, the anti-discrimination statutes.
113. See Horowitz, supra note 110, at 32, where the author argues that apartment
house discrimination, either in leasing or selling, is the action of a vendor expressing
the wishes of the other tenants and in a sense is involuntary, thus being a clearly
evidenced 'legal relationship" that a court would enforce. He also suggests that this
involuntary expression of the wishes of other tenants is concerted action which smacks
of Marsh v. Alabama, supra note 101.
114. The possibility of reverter as a discriminatory device has been held not invalid
within the authority of Shelley v. Kraemer. Charlotte Park & Recreation Comr'n
v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956). But see
Capital Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Smith, 136 Colo. 265, 316 P.2d (1957); see
generally Sams, Application of the Doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer to the Determinable
Fee, 33 Miss. L.J. 200 (1962). The grantor of a determinable fee with a possibility
of reverter and his successors in interest retain a property interest which, it could
be argued, should be protected by the fourteenth amendment. See Comment, 9
V ND. L. REv. 561 (1956).

1830

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 18

have acquired some interest in the property-principally by way of
the execution of a contract of sale-for the reverter to operate. The
only solution for the condominium here would be to provide for the
reverter to operate on some contingency occurring before the discrimination victim acquired any litigable interest in the property,
apart from the complaint that he was simply being discriminated
against. Such a contingency would perhaps be difficult to determine
and thus render the use of the possibility of reverter infeasible.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that a possibility of reverter will operate
automatically without court enforcement of the rights of the holder
of the reversionary interest. It is also possible that a court could
disregard the effect of what appears to be an automatically vesting
future interest, and simply call the condition a covenant. 1 5
V.

CONCLUSION

This note assumes that any condominium will require a device for
preventing the intrusion of undesirable tenants as a part of the
documents establishing the project. Clearly a covenant against use
or occupancy by a certain class of persons not only invites a ruling
of invalidity as discriminatory, but also leaves unsolved the problem
of reserving for unit owners an opportunity to choose their neighbors
and social communicants in the common elements of condominium
ownership on bases other than race or religion. Sale only by consent
of the co-owners raises the same considerations regarding discrimination in use as does the right of first refusal, but requiring consent
instead of an exercise of first refusal clearly violates the rule against
restraints on alienation. In the right of first refusal itself problems
not directly concerning its legal validity can be seen; for example,
practical considerations such as where the money is to be raised to
effect the exercise of the first option if so desired, or moral considerations as to what are reasonable criteria for excluding a person from
buying a unit. Tested reasonable use of the right way may serve to
strengthen a policy argument against application of the rule against
perpetuities-the one common law sanction to which the right seems
most vulnerable.
115. See Capital Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Smith, supra note 114: "No matter by
what ariose terms the covenant under consideration may be classified by astute counsel,
it is still a racial restriction in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. That this is so has been definitely decided by the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States. High sounding phrases or outmoded common law
terms cannot alter the effect of the agreement embraced in the instant case. While the
hands may seem to be the hands of Esau to a blind Isaac, the voice is definitely Jacob's.
We cannot give our judicial approval or blessing to a contract such as is here involved."
Id. at 255.
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Can these problems be eliminated by using no pre-conceived
exclusionary device at all? Ordinary landlords, being their own
judges as to whom they shall allow lessees to sublet or assign leases,
find it easier and not so confusing to old and prospective lessees to
consent to new tenants on an ad hoc basis. Usually no rules for
approval are ever reduced to writing and fewer yet are honored.
Following such a practice in a condominium is hardly practicable
because individual owners have different ideas as to acceptable
neighbors. Nevertheless, a control system could be worked out through
a resolution process in the association of owners-either a covenant
among themselves (indeed, a "tacit understanding") that they will
submit buyers to the association for approval, or an ad hoc approval
system whenever there is a reasonable complaint by an owner
who learns that his neighbor is negotiating a sale to an undesirable.
In this way, ideas as to acceptability are refined through the less
irrational force of common opinion.
Ad hoc approval is advantageous in that there is no written provision that could be ruled a limitation on the legal title to a unit. It is
also advantageous in that it tends to eliminate pre-existing plans for
discrimination. In the final analysis, it preserves the self-assurance
and secure feeling of each owner that an unencumbered fee is his
to dispose of as he wishes.
But security is also knowing that your investment in a living
project will be protected; that you can realize an adequate retufn
and profit when the time comes to sell; and that qualified prospective
tenants will not shy away because they foresee the possibility that
they will have to live with whomever the market uncovers. Of these,
the condominium tenant will want definite assurance-a pre-existing,
enforceable plan for maintaining compatibility. It is submitted that
the right of first refusal can provide this assurance-considering,
however, the increasing social pressure against discrimination in
commerce for reasons other than financial incapacity. It is also
submitted that the right of first refusal, like any other restrictive device
on otherwise alienable property, is subject to the risks of public
disfavor.
IRA E. P~AmR III

